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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
B A I L E Y S E R V I C E k S U P P L Y 
Corporation, a Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
T H E S T A T E OF U T A H , by and 
through its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Defendant-AppelUmt. 
B R I E F O F A P P E L L A N T S 
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
This is an appeal from the judgment of the lower 
court on cross motions for summary judgment for 
money damages awarded to the plaintiff by reason of 
the erection of a viaduct on Fourth South Street in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff 
for money damages under a Memorandum Decision 
I Case No. 
I 13857 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
finding a "taking" resulting from the erection of the 
viaduct. (R. 11-12) 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Appellant seeks a ruling reversing the judgment 
of the lower court as being contrary to the law in this 
jurisdiction, and awarding judgment of no cause of 
action to appellant as a matter of law. 
S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS 
The controversy arises out of the erection of a 
viaduct over the railroad tracks West on Fourth South 
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, by the defendant-ap-
pellant. Whereas, plaintiff had been able to use the whole 
width of Fourth South Street to gain access to its 
property prior to the construction, thereafter vehicles 
of the size previously used were not able to be utilized 
because the wall of the viaduct left 22'8" (two lanes) 
in front of the property and physically prevented use 
of the whole width of the street to maneuver. 
For reasons which are not relevant to the issue 
here the State Road Commission authorized the execu-
tion of a Stipulation purporting to waive Governmental 
Immunity. (R. 71) 
However, prior to argument by the respective 
parties of the cross motions for summary judg-
ment, defendant determined that the attempt to 
waive Governmental Immunity was in all probability 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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without lawful sanction and so advised plaintiff. The 
issue of Governmental Immunity was raised in the 
memorandum supporting defendants motion for sum-
mary Judgment (R. 29) and argued in the lower court. 
Defendants answer did put in issue the stating of a 
claim upon which relief could be granted. (R. 68) 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
ONLY T H E L E G I S L A T U R E O F T H E 
S T A T E O F U T A H H A S A U T H O R I T Y 
TO W A I V E G O V E R N M E N T A L IM-
M U N I T Y I N U T A H A N D T H E LOW-
E R COURT E R R E D I N R E F U S I N G 
T O C O N S I D E R O R G I V E D U E 
W E I G H T TO T H I S I S S U E . 
Until 1965 Utah operated under a rule of law 
long and firmly established, of complete Governmental 
Immunity. The 1965 session of the Utah Legislature 
enacted what is now Chapter 30 of Title 63, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, and known and cited 
as "The Utah Governmental Immunity Act". The 
effect of the Act is not only to waive the states im-
munity for certain conduct on the part of agencies or 
units of government, but also to legislatively retain, 
reinforce and sanction the ancient rule of Governmental 
Immunity in respect to other areas of conduct. I t is 
submitted that the legislature retained, reinforced and 
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maintained Governmental Immunity for the acts for 
which plaintiff has sought relief in the instant case. 
Section 3 of the referenced Act provides: 
"Except as may be otherwise provided in 
the act, all governmental entities shall be 
immune from suit for any injury which may 
result from the activities of said entities where-
in said entity is engaged in the exercise and 
discharge of a governmental function." 
Other provisions of the Act waive immunity for 
certain matters (i.e. contractual obligation, Sec. 5; un-
safe highways, Sec. 8) but in no provision of the Act 
is it "otherwise provided" that Governmental Immunity 
is waived for actions such as that brought by the plain-
tiff in this case. Thus., Section 3 of the Act serves as 
an insurmountable barrier to the successful maintenance 
of this case by plaintiff. The lower court, counsel, and 
the Road Commission are without legal authority to 
set aside this affirmative action of the Legislature of 
this State. 
In some jurisdictions the Attorney General has the 
powers of an attorney general at common law, and 
Utah so ruled in Hansen v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d. 47, 
456 P.2d 177 (1969). This decision states the following 
proposition: 
. . . the Attorney General, in the absence of 
express legislative restriction to the contrary, 
may exercise all such power and authority as 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the public interests may from time to time re-
quire. In short the Attorney General's powers 
are as broad as the common law unless re-
stricted or modified by statute . . . 
Appellant submits that the legislature by enacting the 
Governmental Immunity Act in 1965 effectively pre-
empted the otherwise inherent right of the Attorney 
General to waive Sovereign Immunity if indeed the 
Attorney General ever in fact had the right to waive 
Sovereign Immunity in any case. 
In Fairclough v. Salt Lake Co. 10 Utah 2d 117 
(1960) the Court held that sovereign immunity could 
not be waived except by constitutional or legislative 
enactment. The court further held that neither by con-
stitutional nor legislative action had that doctrine been 
waived in this jurisdiction. The court said: 
. . . consistently and historically we have 
ruled that the State may not be sued without 
its consent, that Article I , § 22 of our Constitu-
tion is not self executing, nor does it give con-
sent to be sued, implied or otherwise; and that 
to secure such consent is a legislative matter 
. . . (emphasis added) 
Further, in the Fairclough case, supra, the court quoted 
from Hjorth v. Whittenhurg, 121 Utah 324 (1952) 
on this issue of sovereign immunity: 
This phase of our law is well established 
and of long standing. If it is to be changed, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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that must come through the sovereign power 
of the commonwealth, the people, speaking 
through the legislature, (emphasis added) 
I t is thus the clearly enunciated rule in this jurisdiction 
that Governmental Immunity is waived only by legis-
lative authority and not by agencies, departments or 
employees of the State. 
As heretofore observed the legislature has since 
these cases, enacted the Governmental Immunity Act, 
but this enactment restates and reinforces sovereign im-
munity in the area at issue here. Decisions of this court 
since passage of the Governmental Immunity Act 
strongly reinforce this position. 
In State Road Commission v. Utah Sugar Com-
pany, 22 Utah 2d 77 (1968), a case coming after enact-
ment of the Governmental Immunity Act, the court 
clearly ruled that for actions of this type the Sovereign 
Immunity and the police power of the State had not been 
waived by legislative action when it said at p. 81: 
"Nor does the right to ingress or egress 
to or from ones property include any right in 
and to existing public traffic on the highway 
. . . The reason is that all traffic on public high-
ways is controlled by police power of the State 
and what this police power may give an 
abutting property owner . . . it may take 
away. . . ." 
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The court went on to say that diversion of traffic was 
not compensable in that case "because such damages 
are 'damnum absque injuria' or damages without legal 
injury." 
A case even more to the point is the recent (1973) 
one of Holt v. Utah State Road Commission 30 Utah 
2d 4. Therein the plaintiff sought to recover damages 
for impaired access, precisely as in the instant case. After 
observing that there was no taking of property involved 
in that action, a condition identical again with the case 
at issue, the court, speaking through Justice Crockett 
held: 
The law has long been established in this 
State that under these circumstances there can 
be no recovery from the State for damages 
because the construction of a highway may 
impair or adversely affect the convenience of 
access to property. 
The court then cites a series of cases by footnote, most 
of which are referred to in this brief, as having estab-
lished that rule. Thus, it appears clearly that this court 
has maintained, since the passage of the Governmental 
Immunity Act, the long established rule of sovereign 
immunity and the valid exercise of the police power. 
But we are not left to conjecture as to the courts intent 
in Holt supra, for the court goes on to say that plain-
tiffs there urged that since the Governmental Immunity 
Act, it "should now be construed as permitting the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
maintenance of such an action". After quoting Section 
3 of the Act, supra, the court concludes: 
This seems to indicate an intention that 
the Act be strictly applied to preserve sover-
eign immunity; and to waive it only as clearly 
expressed therein,, 
I t is apparent from the authorities cited, both the 
Governmental Immunity Act and the case law, that the 
attempted waiver by the authority of the State Road 
Commission and counsel, of the States' immunity in 
this case was void from the beginning, the legislature 
being the only body authorized to waive the State's 
immunity. 
In its Memorandum Decision (R. 11) the lower 
court attempts to distinguish Springville Banking Com-
pany v. Burton 10 Utah 2d 100 by noting that that case 
was a case of sovereign immunity with no taking and 
resulting inconvenience. I t is respectfully urged that 
this distinction is non existent since those are the identi-
cal factors existing in both cases. After noting that the 
issue of sovereign immunity had been raised by defen-
dant the court says in its Memorandum Decision: 
However, in its brief at the top of page 
10 defendant quotes a section from '3 Nichols 
on Eminent Domain' which quotation would 
indicate that the Springville Banking Case 
and other Utah cases following the general 
theory set forth therein, would not apply. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Defendant can only conclude that the Honorable Judge 
of the lower court views Nichols admittedly a pre-emin-
ent authority in his field,as empowered to overrule not 
only the wisdom of the Legislature of Utah but also 
the judgments of this Honorable Court. With due de-
ference to the excellence of both the authority (Nichols) 
and the lower court, we respectfully suggest that this 
is not and cannot be the status of the law in this juris-
diction. 
In any event, the citation from Nichols, while ac-
cepted and urged by the defendant is not germane nor 
relevant to the issue for which it was cited by the lower 
court. There is no dearth of matters for which the law 
would and does allow compensation provided there is 
a lawful vehicle for getting the matter before the court 
and the police power is not prohibitive. 
The fact that the damages alleged may be recover-
able except for the valid and time honored bar of Sover-
eign Immunity does not work to invalidate the otherwise 
quite proper exercise of that bar. The quotation cited 
from Nichols deals with the compensability or non com-
pensationability of a damage in eminent domain. This 
is not a case of eminent domain. The use of the citation 
by defendant in its brief as cited by the lower court was 
addressed to the merits of plaintiff's case, not to the 
issue of Sovereign Immunity and further reference will 
be made thereto in the section of this brief dealing with 
the merits. Defendant asserts that the error of plaintiff's 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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argument, as indeed the position adopted by the court 
below, is the assumption that all damage is compensable. 
The law of sovereign immunity and the valid exercise 
of the police power both represent areas where the court 
has negated that assumption on numerous occasions. 
(Springville Banking Company v. Burton, Supra; 
Anderson Investment Corporation v. Utah State Road 
Commission, et aL, 28 Utah 2d 379; Hurst v. Highway 
Department of State of Utah, 16 Utah 2d 153; and 
cases therein cited.) 
P O I N T I I 
T H E L O W E R COURT E R R E D I N 
C O N C L U D I N G T H A T T H E R E H A D 
B E E N A C O M P E N S A B L E T A K I N G 
F R O M P L A I N T I F F S I N C E T H E VIA-
D U C T W A S B U I L T E N T I R E L Y 
W I T H I N T H E R I G H T OF W A Y A N D 
R E A S O N A B L E ACCESS TO P L A I N -
T I F F S P R O P E R T Y R E M A I N E D 
A F T E R T H E CONSTRUCTION. 
I t appears from the Memorandum Decision (R. 
11 -12 ) of the lower court that the court did not even 
consider the police power doctrine nor the doctrine of 
damnum absque injuria, notwithstanding the numerous 
decisions of this court accepting and reinforcing those 
doctrines (Springville Bank, Anderson Investment, 
Hurst . . . supra) The parties have agreed that plain-
tiff could no longer use the whole of the street to maneu-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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vre large vehicles into its facilities on Fourth South 
Street. The placing of a raised median divider as in the 
Springville Banking case, supra, would have had the 
identical result. Thus, for purposes of this case the erec-
tion of the viaduct may be considered as a raised median 
in testing the compensability of the alleged "take". At 
the hearing before the lower court on cross motions for 
summary judgment counsel for plaintiff objected that 
the exhibits attached to defendants memorandum in 
support of its motion were not sworn to. Then and now 
defendant asserts that no such formality is required 
since plaintiffs own affidavits contain an admission of 
the matter sought to be demonstrated by these exhibits; 
i.e., that prior to the erecting of the viaduct plaintiffs 
required the use of Fourth South across the center 
line thereof to gain access by its large vehicles. (R. 46) 
We respectfully suggest that this court may take 
judicial notice of the fact that large type vehicles do 
in fact cross the centerline of streets in gaining access to 
particular properties. Painted medians do not deter 
such utilization no matter how marked. Does this usage, 
frequently carried on in direct violation of law and 
city ordinances, ripen into a vested right? Or, does the 
jurisdictional authority retain the right to control this 
and other uses by erecting raised medians or other 
structures to control traffic? I t is asserted that at best 
the users acquire no more than permisive and temporary 
right. To view the matter otherwise is to ignore the long 
line of cases both before and since the Springville Bank-
ing case, supra. Further, to hold otherwise would be to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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reverse the long standing rule that one may not adverse 
the Sovereign (Cassity v. Castango, 10 Utah 2d 16; 
City of Oakland v. Burns 296 P.2d 33.) 
On this question, i.e., the acquisition of rights as 
against the city, town or other governmental body in 
connection with streets, it is submitted that the pro-
visions of § 78-12-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended are dispositive. That statute is explicit when it 
says: 
No person shall be allowed to acquire 
any right or title in or to any lands held by 
any town, city or county, or the corporate 
authorities thereof, designated for public use 
as streets . . . or for any other public purpose, 
by adverse possession thereof for any length 
of time . . . (emphasis added) 
The rule is clear that "one may not adverse the Sover-
eign". (Cassity v. Castango, supra; Lund v. Wilcooo, 34 
Utah 205). There is ample case and encyclopedia law 
in support of this position. (55 A L R 2d 598) 
There exists no absolute right to unreasonably deny 
access to property owners who front upon the public 
thoroughfare. Neither the police power reasonably to 
regulate the usage of the thoroughfare nor the principle 
of Sovereign Immunity have been held absolutely to 
bar recovery for unreasonable interference with abutters 
right of access. In Springville Banking, supra, the court 
noted at P . 103 that the principles of equity could be 
invoked to prevent unreasonable interference with 
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abutters rights. Hampton v. State Road Commission 
21 Utah 2d 342 clearly establishes that the principle 
of Sovereign Immunity must yield in the case of a 
complete or nearly complete denial of access. Defendant 
does not take issue with the principles ennunciated in 
that case but on the contrary regards them as salutary. 
Nevertheless, the question here is not such a one. Here 
as in Springville Banking Co. v. Burton,, supra, "access 
has not been denied, interfered with, it is true, but . . . 
to no unreasonable extent". 
The rule of Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So. 
2d 865, quoted at length in Nichols on Eminent Domain 
§ 5.72 at 166 correctly gives perspective to the issues 
of this case when reveiwed on its merits, where it is said: 
The owner of property abutting a public 
way has a right of ingress to and egress from 
his property . . . However, these are rights 
subordinate to the underlying right of the 
public to enjoy the public way to its fullest 
extent as well as the right of the public to have 
the way improved to meet the demands of 
public convenience and necessity. If the im-
provement for the benefit of the public inter-
feres with the preexisting means of ingress 
and egress. . . enjoyed by the individual prop-
erty owner without an actual physical invasion 
of the land of the property owner, then again 
we have a situation where the individual right 
is subordinate to the public good and any al-
leged damages suffered is damnum absque 
injuria. This is so for the simple reason that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
one who acquires property abutting a public 
way acquires it subject and subordinate to the 
right of the public to have the way improved 
to meet the public need." 
No reference is made in the above citation to Sovereign 
Immunity but the issue is determined solely on the public 
interest on the merits, Absent this rule the danger for-
seen by Justice Henroid in the Springville Banking 
casej supra, must be recognized: "Highways would re-
main unmarked (unimproved) because of the prohibitive 
cost involved in payment of damages to owners on both 
sides . . . " 
The court further held in the cited case: 
In this area of the freeway citizens must 
yield to the common weal, albeit injury to their 
property may result. We espouse the notion 
that if the Sovereign exercises its police power 
reasonably and for the good of all the people, 
when constructing highways, consequential 
damages such as those alleged here are not 
compensable." 
The issue, then, is not one of the existence or amount 
of damages, but one of compensability. In order for the 
plaintiff to finally prevail in this matter it is submitted 
that it must show a material distinction between its 
circumstances and those which have prevailed in the long 
line of divider and viaduct cases which have been ruled 
upon by this court and supported by the overwhelming 
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weight of authority from other jurisdictions. I t is re-
spectfully suggested that no such distinction exists. 
In Anderson Investment Corporation v. Utah 
State Road Commission et al., 28 Utah 2d 379 this 
court dealt with a case practically on all fours with the 
instant proceedings. There the State constructed a via-
duct on North Temple Street in Salt Lake City, the 
east end of which was placed in front of the plaintiffs 
property. The viaduct was erected on property owned 
by the State and no real estate was required or acquired 
from the plaintiff. The width of the street remaining 
in front of plaintiff's property was "Seduced, but a lane 
of traffic east on North Temple street remained. Plain-
tiff in the cited case sought approximately $38,000 in 
damages for impairment of access, ingress and egress, 
depreciation of its property and for changing grade in 
front of its premises among other things. The plaintiff 
relied on State v. Fourth Judicial District Court 94 
Utah 384 where the court by Dicta had implied a liabil-
ity on the part of the individual road commissioners 
though the commission itself was held to be immune 
from suit. This court speaking through Justice Ellett 
said: 
" ( H ) ere these Commissioners were in the 
performance of their duties in the exercise of 
the police power of the State to better provide 
for the orderly flow of traffic upon the high-
ways of this state. They are thus given the 
same immunity from suit as is given to the 
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State of Utah or to its commissioners", (em-
phasis added) 
We urge that any practical distinction between the 
instant case and Anderson Investment, supra, favors 
the latter, since the width of the street remaining in 
front of Andersons was considerably less than the plain-
tiff in this action enjoys. Otherwise it is difficult to 
find a distinction since the viaducts are built within 
four blocks of each other in the same city and subject to 
the same legal principles. 
Plaintiff here claims $8700 damages because of its 
need to build a new access point for its large type 
vehicles which can no longer maneuver across the whole 
width of Fourth South Street. On its merits, therefore, 
the case becomes one of ''reasonable" access. Two lanes 
of traffic (more than 22 feet) remain in front of plain-
tiffs premises and thus it is clear that reasonable access 
remains for any ordinary usage. Does the particular 
usage being engaged in by the plaintiff at the time of the 
construction justify a different view? The bulk of de-
fendants memorandum in the court below was directed 
to this question. I t is submitted that the text and case 
law clearly demonstrates that no such view is justified. 
May a particular use ripen into a compensable right 
as against the Sovereign? 
A case almost identical in its facts was before the 
court in Moorlane Co. v. Highway Department of the 
State of Texas, 384 S.W. 2d 415 (1964). The defen-
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dants had constructed a viaduct and a controlled access 
highway through Amarillo which made it impossible for 
large trucks to turn into plaintiff's building, but which 
was wide enough for ordinary traffic flow. The court 
held at p. 418: 
The appellants still had access to their 
property and trucks could load and unload at 
the truck bay of appellants, although the large 
trucks could not use this street in its entirety 
as had been used before the overpass was built 
and were not entitled to recover damages from 
appellees because they could not use all or a 
greater portion of the street in backing the 
large trucks across the street. 
The facts of the Moorlane case are restated in the 
holding and are, it is suggested, identical to those which 
concern us here. The quoted portion of that ruling 
might be lifted verbatim into a commentary on the 
facts of our case. But Texas has not stopped there. In 
a subsequent decision, Collins v. City of San Antonio 
443, S.W. 2d 563 (1969) it is said: "The interference 
with plaintiffs access from Guadalupe Street appears 
to be greater than that which resulted from the con-
struction of the improvements in Moorlane." Yet, after 
noting that the question of unreasonable interference 
with a land owners right of access is one of law, the 
court says: "We hold that as a matter of law, plaintiff 
still has reasonable access to his property from Guada-
lupe Street." 
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In this context we refer to the citation from Nichols 
which the lower court deemed sufficient to amend the 
settled law of this jurisdiction. In 3 Nichols
 y Eminent 
Domain § 10.221 (5) at 377 it is said: 
By the great weight of authority, it has 
been held that the extent of an abutters right 
of access may be reasonably regulated in the 
public interest. Such regulation, however, 
cannot validly extend to the point of total 
deprivation of access without incurring liabil-
ity to pay compensation". 
Elsewhere in this brief we have asserted defendants 
recognition of this general rule as salutary. Our dis-
satisfaction with the ruling of the lower court rests with 
the apparent assumption that the rule proves the fact. 
I t seems that the first sentence of the citation has been 
completely ignored, and that the last sentence is deemed 
a statement of fact in this case. How can it be reasonably 
said that a two lane road, in excess of 22 feet in width 
constitutes a "total deprivation of access"? We respect-
fully suggest that the rule of "reasonableness" of access 
has not yet been applied to the facts of this case. Thus, 
the issue boils down to whether or not the particular 
use heretofore made by the plaintiff in derogation of 
the right of passage and utilization of the roadway by 
other members of the public ripens into a compensable 
right when redressed in favor of the public in general. 
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The case and text law cited hereinabove clearly 
shows that if the decision of the lower court is allowed 
to stand this jurisdiction has significantly retreated 
from, if not overturned, a long established rule as enun-
ciated by this court, and adhered to by our sister states, 
and has embarked on a singular course. 
CONCLUSION 
The action of the lower court in failing to consider 
the States immunity under the law was and is error. 
Neither the State Road Commission nor counsel is 
vested with authority to abrogate the legislative reaf-
firmation of Sovereign Immunity appearing in the 
statutes of this State as the Utah Governmental Im-
munity Act. Thus, defendant was entitled to judgment 
of dismissal as a matter of law. 
A consideration of this case on its merits also en-
titles defendant to a judgment of dismissal. The inter-
ference with plaintiffs access is not unreasonable on 
the criteria established by this court and followed by 
other jurisdictions. On the contrary it clearly appears 
that the construction of the viaduct was in furtherance 
of the duties and responsibilities of the State Road 
Commission in the public interest and that the control of 
traffic resulting therefrom was well within the police 
power of the State. Thus any damages suffered by the 
plaintiffs must be held to be damnum absque injuria 
and non compensatory under the settled law of this 
jurisdiction. 
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I t is respectfully urged that this court reverse the 
judgment of the lower court and judgment be ordered 
for defendant as a matter of law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
V E R N O N B. R O M N E Y 
Attorney General 
M A R K A. M A D S E N 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 
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